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COURTS AND THE CHURCHES IN MISSOURI:
A SURVEY OF MISSOURI LAW ON INTRA-CHURCH
DISPUTES WITH REFERENCE TO THE POLITICAL
THEORY OF THE PLURALISTS
JOSEPH 0. LOSOSt
In September 1954 the St. Louis Court of Appeals handed down a
decision in the case of Mertz v. Schaeffer., This case arose out of the
bitter disputes in the Missouri Lutheran community that developed
after the Missouri Synod of the Lutheran Church proclaimed a Com-
mon Confession which differed in certain respects from the dogmas
of the national church. The confession was issued in 1950; the follow-
ing year, in a meeting held at the Trinity Lutheran Church, a minority
of the members of that church discountenanced the newly proclaimed
con fession and expressed their support of the orthodox beliefs. Sev-
eral more meetings were held during the summer, all marked by
minority attendance, and at one of those meetings the minority group
voted to leave the Missouri Synod. Early in December a majority of
the total church membership appeared at a regular meeting and en-
deavored to undo the purported secession, but they were locked out
of the church. The majority then held a meeting outside the church
and voted to rejoin the Missouri Synod; they were at a disadvantage
in their subsequent efforts to actually control the church premises,
however, because the regular pastor supported the minority. There-
upon they brought suit to enjoin the minority from interfering with
their use and control of the church property.
The court of appeals, in a decision by Commissioner Wolfe, upheld
the majority. The court based its opinion upon a finding that the
meeting in December expressed the valid determination of the opinion
of the church membership. The court said that since the December
gathering was a regular meeting (or would have been had it been per-
mitted to meet regularly), with a majority in attendance, and since
majority rule was the established system in the church, the court
should defer to the majority. The court also declared, however, that
it would not permit a change in the beliefs of the church from one
religion to another even by a majority, but conceded that it would
interfere to prevent this only if such a shift were fundamental. Here,
the court said, the differences between the ideas of the disputing
parties were infinitesimal.
t Member of the Missouri Bar.
1. 271 S.W.2d 238 (Mo. App. 1954).
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This opinion was short and logically fluent, but it nevertheless pre-
sented many of the problems of a subject both intrinsically complex
and consitutionally perplexing. The questions of judicial adjudication
of actions arising out of intra-church quarrels have troubled Missouri
courts since shortly after the Civil War, but a whole new focus has
recently been added by the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedra.2 It will be the purpose of
this article to consider the relation of Missouri law to the Kedroff
decision, and the relation of both to the political thought of what is
known as the philosophy of pluralism. Finally, I shall try to suggest
some criteria to be applied in this area, using Missouri as an example.
The problem of judicial interference in intra-church disputes first
arose in Missouri in the 1860's. During the Civil War the Presby-
terian Church took an increasingly active stand in support of the
Northern cause. The edicts of the General Assembly of the church
denouncing slavery and applauding the federal government naturally
annoyed the pro-Southern communicants, and the latter drew up a
vigorous protest known as "The Declaration and Testimony." This
in turn impelled the General Assembly to denounce the declaration
and, when the pro-Southern group remained firm, to order those who
still supported the declaration position to be dropped from the rolls of
the Presbyterian Church. This action was denounced as illegal by
those who were removed inasmuch as it was, they contended, unjusti-
fied by any fault on their part. The trustees of Lindenwood College in
St. Charles (a Presbyterian Church school) were members of the
ousted group. The state administration, which was then Republican,
brought a quo warranto action against these trustees, alleging that
they no longer had a right to sit as the representatives of the Presby-
terian Church. The case, State ex rel. Watson v. Farris,3 reached the
Missouri Supreme Court in 1869. Judge Wagner, whose position on
the court was a result of a kind of court-packing by the Republican
administration,4 decided for the plaintiff and refused to allow the
members of the ousted group to serve as trustees. The court said
that the church's General Assembly had determined who had the
right to be a Presbyterian, and that since the highest authority of the
Presbyterian Church had decided that the incumbent trustees were
no longer in good standing, the court could not hold that they were.
The pro-Southern group was labelled as secessionist, and thus the
religious dispute in Missouri was treated as a microcosm of the po-
litical controversy which had split the nation.
2. 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
3. 45 Mo. 183 (1869).
4. BARCLAY, THE LIBERAL REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT IN MissoURi 1865-1871, at 21
,(1926).
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The matter was not at an end, however. The decision applied in
its terms, of course, only to Lindenwood College. A dispute over the
control of the First Presbyterian Church of St. Charles reached the
supreme court a few years later, and this case, Watson v. Garvin,5
was decided for the pro-Southern group. Judge Bliss approached the
problem as one which concerned only a local church group, thus dis-
tinguishing the Farris case where the entire Presbyterian Church
was interested in the management of Lindenwood College. The court
reasoned that there was an independent right of property in the local
church deriving from the form in which the property was held-
"in trust for the congregation of the First Presbyterian Church of
St. Charles"-and from the rights of local congregations recognized
by church doctrine. Judge Bliss drew a distinction between excom-
munication and the action of the General Assembly in dropping the
names of the pro-Southern group from the rolls. Because the pro-
Southern group had not been excommunicated, it followed that there
was no question of their being Presbyterians. Since they were the
majority of the congregation, they had the right to control the church
property. This was especially true, Judge Bliss thought, in light of the
summary method by which the group had been treated by the General
Assembly.
Before the Garvin decision was printed in the reports, the United
States Supreme Court decided the famous case of Watson v. Jones.,
This case arose in Kentucky out of circumstances very similar to those
in several previous Kentucky cases. The case was heard in the federal
court because of diversity of citizenship and, inasmuch as Erie R.R.
v. Tornpkins7 had not yet been decided, the Supreme Court, speaking
through Justice Miller, held that the Kentucky decisions in favor of
the pro-Southern group were irrelevant to the determination of this
case. The rationale of the Supreme Court was based upon an inquiry
into the jurisdiction of the court. It was held that the civil courts
could not upset a decision by the highest tribunal of the church upon a
question within its jurisdiction. To Justice Miller, "jurisdiction"
meant the authority to decide certain types of disputes. For example,
an ecclesiastical court could not sentence a man to death or imprison-
ment, but it could decide religious controversies. Thus, in the Jones
case, the civil courts could not inquire whether the General Assembly
had a right, pursuant to the customs and usages of the church, to take
a stand on the issue of slavery and make this a religious doctrine.
The court recognized a right in the church, a right grounded in the
tradition of religious freedom, to interpret its own laws.
5. 54 Mo. 353 (1873).
6. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
7. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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When this decision was announced the anti-Southern group in the
Presbyterian Church asked for a rehearing in the Garvin case. The
rehearing was granted, but the original decision was sustained., This
time the Missouri Supreme Court, in an opinion by Judge Adams,
took a more uncompromising position. The statement that the South-
ern supporters were still Presbyterians was again emphasized. This
led to a puzzling suggestion that if the pro-Southern group had been
excommunicated they would have lost their rights but, having been
merely dropped from the rolls, they retained control of the local
church despite their bad standing with the national organization.
Therefore, following the original decision, they still had a property
right in the St. Charles church building and other assets. But this
was only used as a secondary argument. The principal reason given
for the decision was that the Presbyterian Church had broken its own
rules by taking up a political issue. This rationale involved, of course,
a direct attack on the Supreme Court's decision in Watson v. Jones
and, more specifically, upon Justice Miller's concept of jurisdiction.
Judge Adams disagreed strongly with that opinion, and this dis-
agreement extended to its premises as well as to its result. Judge
Adams agreed with Justice Miller that the only reason that courts do
not interfere with ecclesiastical decisions is a lack of jurisdiction, but
Judge Adams used the term jurisdiction in the narrowest sense: a
lack of an issue justiciable in the courts of the land. Where there is
property, there are property rights, and it is the duty of the courts
to determine these rights. The courts should review any action of the
ecclesiastical body with reference to these property rights. It was said
to be against the internal Presbyterian law for the church to inter-
fere in matters of state; actions taken pursuant to such interference
would be void.
These decisions reflect the beliefs and emotions of the Civil War and
the slavery struggle, but they also indicate much of the logic of the
respective philosophies regarding the church-state relationship. Jus-
tice Miller and Judge Wagner thought in terms of the jurisdiction of
the church court, and they thought this jurisdiction extended widely
over church affairs and was final within its own province. Judge
Adams thought in terms of the jurisdiction of civil courts, and
reached the conclusion that the courts should determine all property
matters. While it is true that Judge Wagner, in the Farris case, men-
tioned that civil courts must determine property matters, it is obvious
that this meant to him merely that the state must settle the matter
formally by providing the authoritative forum. Thus, under this in-
terpretation, the Missouri courts would be in much the same position
8. Watson v. Garvin, 54 Mo. 353, 369-85 (1873).
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in cases involving intra-church disputes as they would be in hearing
a case arising out of a tort committed in Kansas. The hearing of the
case, the jurisdiction over the subject matter, does not mean that the
Missouri courts can render a decision based upon an independent
interpretation of Kansas law. Similarly, the civil courts would have
to defer to church authority. This facet of the question of jurisdiction
was considered more explicitly in some later cases.9
Another approach, besides the concept of jurisdiction, was intro-
duced by Justice Miller in Watson v. Jones.10 He divided the cases
involving intra-church disputes before the civil courts into three cate-
gories: (1) cases where the civil courts must interpret a trust; (2)
cases concerning churches governed in a congregational fashion; and
(3) cases concerning churches organized on a hierarchial basis. It
was his purpose to restrict the first category to instances where spe-
cific trust purposes were clearly set forth in the trust instrument. In
these cases the civil courts would have to make an adjudication just
as they would in any trust problem. In the second category, the civil
court should defer to the congregation; likewise in the third, the rul-
ing of the church should be controlling. The first expression of an
antithetical viewpoint in Missouri can be seen in Watson v. Garvin,"
where it is suggested that the St. Charles congregation had a special
status merely because its members were technically the beneficiaries of
the deed of the property. Justice Miller would not have considered this
a trust problem since specific trust purposes were not set forth in the
deed. The distinction in the two cases is thus based, in part, upon how
broadly or how narrowly Justice Miller's trust category is interpreted.
These fundamental questions were not presented in so sharp a focus
in less agitated times. The problems were still extant, however. In
a case involving a dispute between the pastor and the elders of the
Christian Church of Neeper, the Missouri Supreme Court, in Prickett
r. WcUs,1' held that, according to church usage, the elders were to de-
cide who had the right to be pastor. The court used language regard-
ing the necessity for a judicial determination of property rights, but
all that was done, as a matter of fact, was to find that the elders and
not the pastor held the authority in the church. In Russie v. Brazzell"
the same court had a knottier problem. In 1885 the General Con-
ference of the United Brethren of Christ had voted to amend their
constitution and draw up a confession of faith. In 1889 the confession
and amendments had been submitted to the membership of the church
in accordance with the church constitution, which provided that all
9. See text at p. 80 i2fra.
10. See note 6 supra.
11. See note 5 supra.
12. 117 Mo. 502, 24 S.W. 52 (1893).
13. 128 Mo. 93, 30 S.W. 526 (1895).
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constitutional changes had to be ratified by two-thirds of the member-
ship. The changes had carried by about 50,000 votes to 3,000, out of
a total of over 200,000 church members; and the highest tribunal of
the church had held that two-thirds of those voting was a sufficient
majority. A quarrel then developed in the Eaglesville Church of the
United Brethren of Christ between a faction accepting the new con-
fession and a faction opposed to it. As in the great majority of cases,
the legal title to the church property was held in trust for the congre-
gation,1 and Judge McFarlane deemed it essential to determine
whether the changes had resulted in a breach of trust. The court care-
fully inspected the changes and decided that they were not funda-
mental, and did not cause a loss of the church's doctrinal identity.
The court then went on to determine that whether the constitution
had been properly amended was a question on which the.church tri-
bunal's decision was final. Thus, on this point the court deferred to
the interpretation of church law by a church tribunal, but on the more
important question of church doctrine there was no such language of
deference.
The development of the broad interpretation of the "trust" cate-
gory was continued in Fulbright v. Higginbotham. As a result of
a clash over doctrinal differences, the church deacons of the Pleasant
Hill Baptist Church brought an action to enjoin the defendant trustee
and a minority of the membership of the church from interfering with
the church property. Judge McFarlane, relying on the language in
Prickett v. Wells' 6 and his own opinion in Russie v. Brazzell, pro-
ceeded along the established line of reasoning that since the issue
concerned the rights of the parties with regard to property which
was held under a deed of trust, the state had to decide the matter just
as it would any other trust. The court granted the injunction, how-
ever, without actually considering any question of church doctrine,
on the technical ground that no breach of trust was alleged.
The trend toward a broad interpretation of the trust category was
somewhat checked in Turpin v. Bagby,18 again decided by Judge
McFarlane. The property in question had been conveyed in trust to
be "used, kept, maintained and disposed of as a place of divine wor-
ship for the use of the Ash Grove Baptist Church."'1 There was no
doubt that the constituted government of the church was rightfully
running the church; the only issue was a bald one of doctrine. It was
14. Since Chambers v. St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543 (1860), charitable trusts had been
unquestionably valid, so the trust method of holding property was common.
15. 133 Mo. 668, 34 S.W. 875 (1896).
16. See note 12 supra.
17. See note 13 supra.
18. 138 Mo. 7, 39 S.W. 455 (1897).
19. Id. at 9, 39 S.W. at 456.
72*
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quite clear that a decision in this case to inspect the beliefs of the
parties would involve the courts in considering every doctrinal dis-
agreement that arose in any church organized on a trust basis, and
the court refused to interfere.
But the deviation represented by the Tutrpi'n case seemed only a
temporary aberration when the decision in Boyles v. Roberts20 was
announced. The opinion in that case has been the high-water mark
of intervention by civil courts into church affairs in the history of
Missouri law to the present time. The opinion by Judge Graves is a
long, energetic, and frequently masterful display of Erastian logic,
reinforced by an emotion which occasionally rises to the surface. The
juridical tempest which it set off resulted in the most thorough con-
sideration of the central issues of church-state problems in Missouri
legal history.
The case arose from the effort of the Cumberland Presbyterian
Church to merge with the Presbyterian Church in the United States
of America. The Cumberland Church had split off from the parent
church early in the nineteenth century because of the advocacy of a
program of revivalism and anti-determinism by the founders of the
new church. Later, a difference in attitude toward negro member-
ship developed when the Cumberland Church espoused a negro-
exclusion policy. The main issue, however, was that of free will
versus determinism, and the principal raison d't re of the Cumber-
land Presbyterian Church was its desire to modify the inflexibility of
traditional Calvinism which had dominated the parent church. As
the century progressed, traditional Calvinism became less and less
important in Presbyterianism, and merger plans were considered.
Soon after the turn of the century, definite plans were agreed upon
between the two denominations. To facilitate the merger, the Pres-
byterians amended their Confession of Faith in 1903, and at the same
time issued an explanation of other portions of the confession. There-
after, a formal merger was instituted and approved by a majority of
the presbyteries of both groups.
The Cumberland Presbyterian Church at Warrensburg was under
the control of a group attacking this merger, and the dispute came
before the court in the form of a bill to enjoin the dissenting group
at Warrensburg from interfering in any way with the control of the
church property by the pro-merger group. The injunction was denied.
The opening portion of the opinion emphasized the difference between
property matters and ecclesiastical matters, stating that the freedom
of the church in the latter category was unimpaired. Thus, said Judge
Graves, "a deposed minister or an excommunicated member of a
20. 222 Mo. 613, 121 S.W. 805 (1909).
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church cannot appeal to the civil courts for redress. ' 21 It was made
clear, however, that the helplessness of such a person would be due
merely to a lack of a claim for specific relief. If he could establish
the loss of a property right recognized by the courts, he would have
a redress. The line of cases from Prickett v. Wells through Russie V.
Brazzell and Fulbright v. Higginbotham22 were cited to show that
when property rights are involved the civil courts must decide the
issue.
Because there was a dispute over the control of church property,
the court felt justified in considering the question of whether there
was sufficient identity between the two church doctrines to permit a
merger. The vigor of Judge Graves' espousal of a broad trust cate-
gory can best be demonstrated by quoting a paragraph from the
opinion:
That there must be identity of doctrines and faith before a
majority of a church organization can take the church prop-
erty into another church is fully recognized.. . . That in case of
a division in a church organization, that portion of the organiza-
tion, whether the majority or the minority, which adheres to the
existing creed, doctrines and faith at the time of the dispute, is
entitled to the church property, is unquestioned law.2 3
Judge Graves made an inspection of the doctrines of the respective
churches similar to that in the Russie case,24 but far more searching.
His conclusion was that the dissimilarity was so great that a merger
would be prejudicial to the rights of the minority. While admitting
that the doctrine of the Cumberland Church could have been changed
by the members in conformance with their constitution, the court
pointed out that this procedure was not followed. The claim of the
plaintiffs that the merger was authorized under a clause in the church
constitution permitting the absorption of other faiths was indignantly
dismissed as an illogical interpretation. Judge Graves realized that
Justice Miller's ideas in Watson v. Jones were diametrically opposite
to his own, and that the latter's broad concepts of church freedom
from state supervision were inimical to the legal system he was ad-
vocating. Significantly, he referred with praise several times to the
British case of Free Church of Scotland v. Overtoun, 2 which had
already become something of a cause c6lbre throughout the common-
law world as an extraordinary exercise of civil authority to enforce a
rather strict trust upon a religious organization whose principles had
undergone change.
21. Id. at 644, 121 S.W. at 810. -
22. See text supported by hotes 12-15 supra.
23. 222 Mo. at 656, 121 S.W. at 814.
24. See note 13 supra.
25. [1904] A.C. 515. See the discussion of this case in text at note*86 infra.
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A very long dissent was written by Judge Woodson. The restric-
tions on the rights of the church's General Assembly, and particularly
the narrow reading of the absorption clause were protested. Judge
Woodson recognized that the crucial question was that of identity
of doctrine, and he noted that there were many more cases supporting
his position than that of the majority. His opinion, however, pri-
marily emphasized the relation of this case to the broader questions
of religious freedom. Under his view, when the self-government of
the church is invaded, when a minority within the church gain the
upper hand because the civil courts agree with their opinions as to
the fundamentals of the ecclesiastical polity, the rights of the ma-
jority to religious freedom are infringed. Nor must the group loyal
to the decisions of the church government be a majority. The import
of the dissent is clear-when any man who adheres to the laws of the
church as they are interpreted by the responsibile authority in the
church is prevented by the civil courts from enjoying the control
those laws give him, he is at least deprived of property rights. Judge
Woodson speculated on the question of what the courts would do in
interpreting the dogmas of a church whose only rules were those of the
Bible. Would they set themselves up as biblical exegetes? He thought
that to suggest this showed the degree of state control the majority
opinion would introduce. Judge Lamm dissented also, in a much
lighter vein, deploring the furor scribendi and remarking that the
decision had the net result of precluding any hope of Christian unity.
On a motion for rehearing, the decision in Boyles v. Roberts was
upheld in a short and very confusing opinion by Chief Judge Val-
liant,-" During the course of this opinion the Chief Judge remarked
that "it may be conceded that the judgment of the Church court de-
claring the meaning of the Church dogmas is conclusive on all the
members of that Church, but it is not conclusive on those who are not
members."'" This language, of course, undercut the whole basis of
Judge Graves' opinion, and has been quoted since in direct contra-
vention of the rationale of the main opinion.
As a result of the Boyles case it might have seemed that Missouri
would follow England in announcing a policy of state control of intra-
church affairs. In actual effect, however, Judge Graves claimed too
much. The scope of civil control he advocated was apparently too
strong a dose; it is a fact, however, that of the many courts that
considered the validity of the Cumberland-Presbyterian merger, only
Missouri and Tennessee declared it void.2s
26. 222 Mo. at 691, 121 S.W. at 826.
27 Id. at 695, 121 S.W. at 827.
28. See Barkley v. Hayes, 208 Fed. 319, 321 (W.D. Mo. 1913) ; 8 U. Mo. BULL.
L. SEre 24 (1915).
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In 1913 a question of merger similar to that in Boyles v. Roberts
came before a federal court in Missouri in a bill to quiet title to the
property of a great number of churches. The court, in Barkley v.
Hayes,29 reasoned that the logic of Watson v. Jones0 applied, that the
effectuation of this merger was within the powers of the church's
General Assembly, and that, if questions of identity of faith were
important (which it did not concede) there was a sufficient identity.
It concluded its rather short opinion with the statement that under
the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson 31 and Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co. 2 a
federal court need not accept state law as binding, so that Boyles v.
Roberts was treated as irrelevant.
In the year following the Barkley case the Missouri Supreme Court
refused to uphold the Boyles decision. The case, Hayes v. Manning,"
came before the court in a suit for possession of a Cumberland Presby-
terian Church in Marshall, Missouri. The decision was written by
Judge Walker, who had not been on the court at the time of the de-
cision in Boyles v. Roberts. The portion of the Boyles opinion which
dealt with the power of the assemblies of the two churches to arrange
the merger was criticized. In the Boyles case, Judge Graves had taken
a very narrow view of the church's power to alter the status quo.
Judge Walker, on the other hand, emphasized the breadth of powers
needed to carry out all the tasks of the church. These tasks were not
construed to comprise only the most obvious ones. Whereas Judge
Graves could not conceive that the provision permitting absorption of
other denominations could be stretched to sanction a merger, Judge
Walker thought this only common sense. Presbyterian Churches were
governed on the representative system, and representative bodies had
to be given power to implement the wishes of their constituents. If
this was a matter that required the vote of the membership, the re-
quirement was fulfilled in this case, Judge Walker thought, by the
adoption of the merger by the presbyteries. On this point Judge
Graves' opinion had been weakest, for he conceded to the member-
ship the right, if constitutionally exercised, to change the doctrines
of the church. If that was so, why was this not just a case of a doc-
trinal modification? And of course the rigid concept of theological
purity which Judge Graves advanced was inconsistent with the pro-
vision for absorption.
Judge Walker also took direct issue with the "identity of doc-
trines" criterion established by Judge Graves. He quoted the lan-
guage in the Boyles rehearing and reaffirmed the language of State
29. 208 Fed. 319 (W.D. Mo. 1913).
30. See note 6 supra.
31. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
32. 215 U.S. 349 (1910).
33. 263 Mo. 1, 172 S.W. 897 (1914).
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ex rel. Watson v. Farris. 4 His opinion marked, in effect, the triumph
of Judge Woodson's dissenting opinion in the Boyles case. As in that
dissent, issue was taken not only with the reasoning of the majority
in the Boyles case, but also with the inarticulate major premise be-
hind the decision. Judge Walker posited a religious freedom which he
considered basic, a freedom whose extents were pernicious to Judge
Graves. Judge Walker took pains to eulogize the opinions of Justice
Miller, which Judge Graves had so recently deprecated.
Judge Graves dissented, of course, referring once again to the
Prickett, Russie and Fuibright cases. He dissented alone however;
the defeat was complete. The next year a note in the University of
Mi.8souri Bidletin Law Series indicated that the course of the law on
the subject had clearly shifted, approved the change, and remarked
that the vital question in these matters had been changed from that
of identity of doctrine to that of continuity of organization.
A decision in the St. Louis Court of Appeals in 1909 contributed to
this trend. Kix v. Polish Roman Catholic St. Stanislaus Parish36 in-
volved a dispute between the parish priest and a group of parishioners
over the management of the parish's parochial school. The parishioners
wanted the authority to elect the directors of the corporation which
held title to the church property. The Roman Catholic bishop of St.
Louis had formerly held the title, but had conveyed it to a religious
corporation which was composed of six members of the congregation.
In fact, however, the property had still been controlled by the priest
and the bishop after incorporation. The court held for the priest
and concluded that when the bishop held the title he had not held it
as trustee for the congregation in any strict sense, but rather he had
held it for the "church," and that the incorporation did not change
the situation. The deed to the corporation listed the corporation itself
as the cestui que trust, and the court considered the real beneficiary
to be a religious body governed in the Roman Catholic tradition, and
not a state-imposed democratic body. It specifically remarked that it
was not the purpose of Missouri law to convert hierarchical and
synodical church governments into congregational ones. The Klix
case was followed in a somewhat different context in Second Baptist
Church v. Beechani 3 7 where the Springfield Court of Appeals held
that incorporation did not take away previously exercised control by
the congregation.
Of course, in cases clearly within the area of trust interpretation
the civil courts still assumed the task of determining whether there
34. See note 3 supra.
35. 8 U. Mo. BULL. L. SER. 24 (1915).
36. 137 Mo. App. 347, 118 S.W. 1171 (1909).
37. 180 S.W. 1065 (Mo. App. 1915).
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had been a breach of trust. In 1912, Judge Lamm, in the course of
interpreting a rather definite deed of conveyance, held in Strother v.
Barrow38 that it was not a breach of trust for one congregation to
merge into another, thus guarding the flanks, so to speak, of Hayes v.
Manning39 In the more famous case of Mott v. Morris4o Judge Lamm
found a breach of trust in the abandonment of a church building.
On the other hand, the limits of state control were reasserted in a
Kansas City Court of Appeals case, State ex rel. Hynes v. Holy Roman
Apostolic Catholic Church.41 This case involved the excommunication
of a Catholic priest, a situation which had usually been considered as
creating no right of action in the person excommunicated. The court
so held here, reasoning that the loss of salary created no contract right
which the civil courts could protect.
A similar ease arose in the St. Louis Court of Appeals in 1939 in
Olear v. Haniak.4 2 In the intervening quarter-century since the Hynes
case comparatively little litigation on intra-church matters had
reached the Missouri courts. Shortly before the Second World War,
the number of cases suddenly increased, probably because of a stronger
movement for church mergers. In the Olear case a group of parish-
ioners of a Ruthenian (Roman) Catholic Church in St. Louis sought
to remove their priest, who was Ukrainian and therefore unpopular
with many of the Ruthenian parishioners. The court remarked that
ecclesiastical questions belong to ecclesiastical tribunals, citing Boyles
v. Roberts.43 However, the church had rules giving the congregation
a much wider control over affairs than was usual for Catholic
Churches, and the plaintiffs claimed that a right to control the church
property was involved. The court adroitly observed that the plaintiffs
had not exhausted all their remedies in the church hierarchy, and
that furthermore Hayes v. Manning" had established the rule that
the church organization (here the organization of the Roman Catholic
Church) was the final judge of ecclesiastical issues even in matters
involving property, except in special circumstances.
Further support was given to church autonomy in Clevenger v.
McAfee. 45 The Kansas City Court of Appeals, using the Fulbright
case 46 as authority for the rule that force cannot be used by those who
are trying to unseat the governing group, granted the trustees of
church property an injunction against a minority group within the
38. 246 Io. 241, 151 S.W. 960 (1912).
39. See note 33 supra.
40. 249- Mo. 137, 155 S.W. 434 (1913).
41. 183 Mo. App. 190, 170 S.W. 396 (1914).
42. 235 Mo. App. 249, 131 S.W.2d 375 (1939).
43. See note 20 supra.
44. See note 33 supra.
45. 237 Mo. App. 1077, 170 S.W.2d 424 (1943).
46. See note 15 supra.
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church. The process of lawful control was marked as a property
matter to be controlled by the civil courts. The emphasis on church
autonomy was again shown by the Kansas City court in Stone v.
Bogue 7 The dispute arose in the Hedrickite branch of the Mormon
Church over the validity of "five messages" declared by the Twelve
Apostles of the church to be divine. The only real issue in the dispute
was whether there had been coercion at an open meeting of the mem-
bership, and the only indication of violence that the court found was
that an important member of one faction weighed 185 pounds. This
was held to be insufficient evidence of coercion. In the course of the
opinion, after the customary language about the distinction between
ecclesiastical and property matters, the court went on to remark that
the actual property value involved was small, that there was no real
estate, and that, therefore, the internal church decisions should be
given great weight. This kind of realism, although rare in these cases,
demonstrates a consistency with the rationale of Hayes v. Manning,43
and tends to diminish the importance of the property test as a basis
for judicial determination of church matters.
lit 1944 a significant decision was handed down in a federal dis-
trict court in M1issouri. Smith v. Board of Pensions of the Methodist
Church, Inc.,-5 decided by Judge Hulen, involved the status of the pen-
sion fund for retired ministers of the Methodist Episcopal Church,
South, after a merger had taken place with two other Methodist Epis-
copal groups. A group of ministers from the southern church claimed
a distinct property right in the pension fund as of the day of merger.
Eric R.R. v. Tompkins"I had ended the liberty which the federal
courts had exercised in the days of Barkley v. Hayes," but Hayes v.
Manning had also intervened, and the result was quite consistent with
the earlier federal case. Judge Hulen decided for the defendant
church by holding that there had been no diversion of the trust when
ministers of the other churches were included in the plan. If identity
of faith were the criterion, as the Boyles case insisted, there was cer-
tainly sufficient identity here, inasmuch as there was no doctrinal
issue. But, above all, Judge Hulen emphasized that the property issue
was incidental to the ecclesiastical one, and that Hayes v. Manning
had definitely set the law of Missouri on a course favorable to the
settlement of church problems by church bodies. His approval of the
Hayes decision was made manifest by his quotation of Acts 18: 14-15,
and his parallel statement that the American courts should follow the
47. 238 Mo. App. 392, 181 S.W.2d 187 (1944).
48. See note 33 supra.
49. 54 F. Supp. 224 (E.D. Mo. 1944).
5o. See note 7 supra.
5 1. See note 29 supra.
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Roman example and not meddle with what does not concern them.2
Judge Hulen, like Judge Walker, thought that the mere existence of
property matters should not cause the civil courts to make decisions
on church issues, and the similarity of the problems in the two cases
especially led him to follow the result and logic of Hayes v. Manning.
But not all church problems reached the civil courts in the same
form, and it was essential to vary the treatment as the problem dif-
fered. A good example of such variation appeared in the case of
Briscoe v. Williams.53 This was a suit by officers and members of the
Corinthian Mission Baptist Church to enjoin the defendant from act-
ing as pastor. The St. Louis Court of Appeals declared that it had
no jurisdiction over purely religious matters, but it went on to take
up the question of whether the group which ousted the defendant
pastor had authority to do so. The court found that the meeting had
been called on one day's notice, that it had been conducted very irregu-
larly, and that the defendant had not been given a chance to meet the
charges against him; consequently, the injunction was denied. It can
be seen that an important ambiguity is presented which the opinion
does not fully answer. Is the court determining the law of the church,
or is it merely deciding whether the church meeting had jurisdiction
to decide the question? In all cases involving congregational churches
this problem exists. The distinction is admittedly fine, but its im-
portance is great nonetheless, for if the civil courts have free rein to
interpret the church law the trend of opinion will turn again toward
Boyles v. Roberts." On the other hand, a mere search for jurisdiction
will restrain the scope of the court's inquiry to the determination of
whether the body purporting to make a decision has the right to do
so, and not whether they have made a proper decision. The court
appeared to take up the question of authority when it indicated that
the church assembly had no power whatsoever to take the steps they
took and that a meeting irregularly called had no more authority than
a meeting of strangers. On the other hand, the reference made by
the court to the church's rules of procedure, suggests a more active
role on the part of the court. To some extent the court was clearly
supervising the rules of the church, although this may have been sub-
ordinate to its main job of investigating the credentials of the meeting.
A retreat from the more advanced positions of non-intervention
seemed to be taking place. Two years before the Briscoe case the
52. 54 F. Supp. at 236-37. Acts 18: 14-15 read:
14. And when Paul was now about to open his mouth, Gallio said unto the
Jews, If it were a matter of wrong or wicked lewdness, 0 ye Jews,
reason would that I should bear with you.
15. But if it be a question of words and names, and of your law, look ye
to it; for I will be no judge of such matters.
53. 192 S.W.2d 643 (Mo. App. 1946).
54. See note 20 supra.
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Kansas City court, in deciding Marr v. Galbraith,5 had reverted to
a broad interpretation of the trust category in an adjudication of a
dispute over ownership of the proceeds of a fire insurance policy
covering the Walnut Grove Methodist Church. The church property
was held under a deed of trust listing the ministers and congregation
as beneficiaries. The deed was the standard one used by the Methodist
Church nationally and it appeared that the grantor used the trust
primarily to facilitate the making of a gift and not to create a true
trust, yet the court held that the congregation could disregard the
wishes of the constituted church authority. The result was a return
to the logic of Boyles v. Roberts'6 and Watson v. Garvin.57
A less distinct intervention in church authority was displayed in
1946 by the Kansas City Court of Appeals in Trett v. Lambeth 8 A
dispute had broken out in the Center Grove Baptist Church in Howell
City between a group desiring to remain within the loose Baptist con-
vention and a group known as the "Land Marks" who denounced all
compromises with simon-pure congregationalism and wanted to with-
draw from the convention. In a meeting at which about fifty people
were present, it was decided by a vote of ten to none that the church
should leave the convention. Thereafter the group favoring with-
drawal ran the church and constantly endeavoured, the court found,
to exclude their opponents from the church. Six months later another
meeting was held, and a number of the leading opponents of the Land
Marks were expelled from the church. The ousted group sued to en-
join their adversaries from interfering with their use and enjoyment
of church property. The court followed Briscoe v. Williams and looked
to the propriety of the meetings, deciding that the meeting which
had expelled the opponents of the Land Mark group was highly im-
proper. The court also doubted that many of those who had taken
over the control of the church at the first meeting were then bona
fide members of the church. The same problems that existed in the
Briseoc case were evident here.
The following year another Baptist dispute came before the St. Louis
Court of Appeals. The case of Longmeyer v. Payne" arose when a
number of the members of a Hannibal Baptist Church who had been
ousted from the church sued to enjoin the preacher and other mem-
bers of the congregation from controlling the church property. The
dispute centered on the issue of whether certain members who had
not been allowed to vote on the question of ouster because of their
non-attendance at meetings or non-payment of dues had been unjusti-
55, 238 Mo. App. 497, 184 S.W.2d 190 (1944).
56. See note 20 szupra.
57. See note 5 supra.58. 195 S.W.2d 524 (Mo. App. 1946).
59. 205 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. App. 1947).
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flably denied the privilege. The court, in an opinion by Commissioner
Wolfe, after repeating the usual statements about the finality of
ecclesiastical decisions on doctrinal matters, stated that the main
question concerned the makeup of the meeting. This, the court re-
alized, was the purest case of jurisdiction, for the problem came down
to deciding whether the members had an enforceable privilege to
vote; and since there was no higher religious tribunal to decide the
dispute, either the members themselves must decide whether they
could vote, or the civil courts would have to decide. Commissioner
Wolfe held that under church law such disenfranchisement was ir-
regular, and held for the plaintiffs on the theory that the meeting was
improperly constituted.
In 1947 the Missouri Supreme Court, in Ervin v. Davis,00 weakened
the force of the broad interpretation of the trust category in Marr v.
Galbraitk.61 This case involved the enforcement of a trust where the
language of the deed was very similar to the language in the cus-
tomary deeds of title of the Methodist Church, the grantee. The court
held that no charitable trust was created; however, the case was some-
w~lat special since the alleged cestuis que trust were the preachers,
and the Constitution of 1865, in effect when the breach of trust alleg-
edly occurred, forbade trusts for the benefit of ministers. This case
could technically be said to have been decided on this ground, although
the opinion did reflect an unwillingness to renew the search for re-
ligious trusts.
The Marr case was cited by the Springfield Court of Appeals three
years later in Murr v. Maxwell.12 The court accepted the doctrine
that the form of ownership of the property would not determine the
amount of supervision of internal affairs which the civil courts would
exercise. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' efforts to "ex-
clude" them from the Rock Springs Free Will Church were against
church law and thus void. The court reached the conclusion that ex-
pulsion was purely a religious matter, and that the plaintiffs could not
complain to the state courts. In" short, the court held that where the
organization which makes the decision is unquestionably clothed with
the appropriate power, the mode by which their decision is reached
is not to be examined.
Considered thus, the case of Murr v. Maxwell is consistent with
the cases of Briscoe v. Williams, Trett v. Lambeth, and Longmeyer v.
Payne. Not merely consistent but, it is submitted, if viewed with an
eye to a grand plan, they are quite harmonious. The state courts will
not go into theological questions, they will not guarantee a due process
60. 355 Mo. 951, 199 S.W.2d 366 (1947).
61. See note 55 supra.
62. 232 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. App. 1950).
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by the church bodies (except perhaps in a very extreme case), but
they will of necessity inquire whether the decision-making body had
any right to make the decision and whether in making a decision it
was acting freely. The problems which arise in determining these
matters are not always easy to solve, and the issues raised in Mertz v.
Schaeffer .. indicate that the formulation of syllogisms cannot answer
all problems.
Moreover, a new variable was introduced by the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral.,4
This case arose out of a dispute over the control of the St. Nicholas
Cathedral in New York. There was no theological difference between
the two parties; the conflict was between a group desiring the tradi-
tional control of the church by Moscow and a group supporting the
autonomy which developed in many of the Russian Orthodox churches
in America following the Russian Revolution. In 1945 the New York
legislature had passed an act establishing the right of the autonomous
churches to the church property in the State of New York. The New
York Court of Appeals held, both as a matter of common law and of
statutory law, that the group representing the autonomous churches
had the right to the cathedral. '  The United States Supreme Court
reversed the decision, holding that the New York statute interfered
with the petitioner's exercise of religious freedom in violation of the
fourteenth amendment.
The Court's opinion treated the state court's decision as having been
based solely on the statute. Justice Reed, speaking for the majority,
denied that the powers conceded to legislatures in American Com-
rnuni('ations Ass'n, CIO v. Douds- could be extended to sanction a
legislative finding that the ecclesiastical authorities in Moscow were
subject to the domination of Communist Russia. He distinguished the
Douds case on the basis that the privilege of resorting to the NLRB
could be denied to those striving to disrupt commerce for political
purposes, while in Kedroff he thought the courts were dealing with a
a constitutionally protected right of religious freedom. The case of
Latter-Day Saints v. United States was also distinguished on the
ground that it concerned forfeiture of property rights for illegal
practices, a totally different situation from that present in the Kedroff
case. Justice Reed concluded by stating that church rule is supreme
"even in those cases when the property right follows as an incident
from decisions of the church custom or law on ecclesiastical is-
sues .
63. See note 1 supra.
64. 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
65. St. Nicholas Cathedral v. Kedroff, 302 N.Y. 1, 96 N.E.2d 56 (1950).
66. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
67. 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
68. 344 U.S. at 120-21.
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Justice Frankfurter concurred, emphasizing that legislative deter-
mination of church disputes was a violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Justices Black and Douglas also concurred, reiterating their
belief that the fourteenth amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights.
It is not possible to say with certainty how wide the area of con-
stitutional protection has been extended by this decision. At least
one point is reasonably definite: legislative enactments settling intra-
church disputes are not likely to be upheld. It is easy to see why
legislative action should be considered the strongest case for consti-
tutional checks. Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion re-
ferred to the Kulturkampf of the 1870's, in which Bismarck sought
to sever the control of Rome over German Catholics. It is far easier
for a Bismarck to arise in the executive or legislative branches of
government than in the judicial; the customary safeguards against
judicial overassertions are usually far stronger than in other branches
of government, since, as Justice Holmes remarked, judges customarily
make law in the interstices. While it is true that as late as the seven-
teenth century the prevalent idea was that the legislature's principal
duty was to "find" the law, 69 nevertheless, if there is any definitive con-
tribution of the great movement of eighteenth century thought that
culminated in our Constitution, it is the relegation of lawmaking to
the legislature and of interpretation to the judiciary. There are, of
course, great questions on this point in respect to the position of
judges, but the precept that legislatures do not decide cases has been
generally accepted, and for them to do so in an area as sensitive as
that in the Kedroff case would be particularly offensive.
It is interesting that Justice Jackson did not agree with this last
point. Dissenting alone, he commented that the rule of separation of
powers is not a command of the fourteenth amendment. He classified
the problem as one within the state-supervised areas of trust enforce-
ment and property right adjudication. The Russian Orthodox Church
was incorporated in New York, and the state had reserved a power
of control in every charter of incorporation. The action of the State
of New York, Justice Jackson contended, was an exercise of that
power. The fact that legislatures could ignore the wishes of the
church or its members without restraint did not trouble him, and this
is easy to see if the premises of his opinion are accepted. For, as in
the case of Judge Graves in Boyles v. Roberts,70 an outlook which
places emphasis on property aspects or on trust considerations will
ignore, or at least minimize, the whole complex of issues a church-
69. See McILwAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT AND ITS SUPREMACY
(1910).
70. See note 20 supra.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1956/iss1/9
COURTS AND THE CHURCHES
centered analysis produces; and these issues represented to many,
including Justices Miller and Reed, the very key to the matter.
This decision has a fairly narrow ambit, however, if it is concerned
only with legislative enactments-an interpretation placed on it by
the New York Court of Appeals when the case was remanded.71 The
court of appeals upheld its earlier decision, this time placing the
entire weight of the opinion on common-law grounds. To date, few
other courts have had occasion to interpret the Kedroff case.72
If this is all the case signifies there is presumably little current
relevance to Missouri law. Missouri has been happily free from the
plethora of legislative pronouncements of this class in recent years,
but a very interesting case of this type did come up in the post-Civil
War years in Missouri. This was the famous case of Missouri v.
Cunt m ing, ' which arose out of the loyalty oath established by the
Republican administration in Missouri about the time of the close
of the Civil War. A Catholic priest was indicted for preaching with-
out having taken the broadly-phrased oath. The Missouri Supreme
Court, through Judge Wagner, held that no problem of freedom of
religion was involved. If Pennsylvania could pass a Lord's Day Act,
Missouri could surely pass such a bill as this, the court reasoned. The
court also decided that the oath did not violate the ex post facto clause
of the Federal Constitution. Instead of the broad scope of church
autonomy which he had permitted in State ex rel. Watson v. Farris 74
Judge Wagner took a very narrow view of the rights of churches in
the C zom ings case. To Judge Wagner, at any rate, the legislature
could constitutionally establish rules which would be bad common
law for the judges to make. Of course, the political convenience of
both decisions should not be overlooked; it was probably not a co-
incidence that both decisions favored the Northern cause.
When the case went to the Supreme Court of the United States,
the argument for Cummings was placed largely on the ex post facto
clause and the prohibition against bills of attainder, since the case
arose before passage of the fourteenth amendment, not to mention the
recent development toward reading the terms of the first amendment
into the fourteenth. Cummings' attorney, Reverdy Johnson, did argue,
however, that while the first amendment does not apply to the states,
"it announces a great principle of American liberty. . . . It is almost
inconceivable that in this civilized day the doctrines contained in
71. St. Nicholas Cathedral v. Kedroff, 806 N.Y. 38, 114 N.E.2d 197 (1953).
72. Romanian Orthodox Missionary Episcopate v. Trutza, 205 F.2d 107 (6th
Cir. 1953); Ginassi v. Samatos, 3 Ill. App. 2d 514, 123 N.E.2d 104 (1954);
Trustees of Methodist Church v. Methodist Church of Greenland, 98 N.H. 498, 104
A.2d 204 (1954).
73. :'6 Mo. 263 (1865), Wev'd, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
74. See note 3 .spra.
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this constitution should be considered as within the legitimate sphere
of human power." 75 Today it is established doctrine that it is beyond
the legitimate sphere of state power to enforce a law respecting an
establishment of religion or the free exercise thereof. But exactly
what does this doctrine mean?
It would seem from Justice Reed's opinion in the Kedroff case that
this doctrine means state action, in any form, inconsistent with the
theory of Watson v. Jones.7 6 Freedom to select the clergy and the
"church's choice of its own hierarchy" are explicitly stated by Justice
Reed in the Kedroif case to be rights which the states cannot infringe.
If Watson v. Jones is now constitutional law, as has been suggested,",
then a whole strand of Missouri law presumably is retrospectively
unconstitutional.7 8 This is a bold step to take, and it is not clear that
it is really the effect of the decision. The New York Court of Appeals
obviously did not think it was when it decided the Kedrof case on
remand. The Supreme Court spent a considerable amount of time
dealing with statutory enactments and legislative power, more time
perhaps than would be necessary if this case were basically concerned
with all forms of state control. Yet, at several places Justice Reed
does seem to be dealing with the case as though it were more than a
question of legislative power. At the end of the opinion he declares:
Ours is a government which by the "law of its being" allows
no statute, state or national, that prohibits the free exercise of
religion. There are occasions when civil courts must draw lines
between the responsibilities of church and state for the dispo-
sition or use of property. Even in those cases when the property
right follows as an incident from decisions of the church custom
or law on ecclesiastical issues, the church rule controls. This
under our Constitution necessarily follows in order that there
may be free exercise of religion.79
The question arises as to what is the nature of the right that the
Supreme Court is protecting in Kedrof. Justice Reed referred to the
problem of interference with the free exercise of religion many times,
while he used the language of separation of church and state only
once. The latter concept is very awkward in these matters, for the
courts must decide these cases and in favoring one side or the other
an issue of establishment seems to be forcing the English language.
Liberty is a more appealing concept and, although the entire first
75. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 313 (1866).
76. See note 6 supra.
77. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952), The Supreme Court,
1952 Term, 67 HARV. L. REV. 91, 110 (1953).
78. See Boyles v. Roberts, 222 Mo. 613, 121 S.W. 805 (1909); Fulbright v.
Higginbotham, 133 Mo. 668, 34 S.W. 875 (1896); Watson v. Garvin, 54 Mo. 353(1873).
79. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 120-21 (1952) (The foot-
notes in the quoted material have been omitted.).
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amendment is now in effect incorporated into the fourteenth, ° the
portions on liberty are more easily consonant with the terms of the
fourteenth amendment.
Whose liberty is being protected? When Justice Reed talks about
the church's choice of its clergy, of its control over its own govern-
ment, is he giving the church rights qua church? If so, is this not
inconsistent with Hague a'. CIO"' and other cases which have set down
the rule that only natural persons have a right to liberty under the
fourteenth amendment? Perhaps the Kedroff case marks a breach
in that rule, a breach which writes into constitutional law the phil-
osophy of the pluralist political theorists.
There can be no doubt that the writings of these theorists are
relevant to problems discussed herein; so many of them were written
in direct response to actual cases dealing with this very problem of
state control over intra-church matters. Any consideration of the
law as it ought to be should take into account a movement which,
although brief in the years of its popularity, has certainly been one
of the most thought-provoking in the history of modern Western
political theory. It is not often that political thought and private
law come so close; if there is any advantage in the cross-fertilization
of the social sciences, in the consideration of practice against the
background of theory, and vice versa, this area may be almost ideal
for such a comparison.
Pluralism, as it is known today, originated with the German his-
torian, Otto von Gierke, who lived in the period of the Hohenzollern
Empire. Gierke was a medievalist with the customary reverence for
the spirit of the Middle Ages, and he viewed that spirit as one marked
by the abundance of groups and the group-mindedness of the people.
Men thought of earthly associations as, at best, imperfect copies of a
divine order, and the guilds and communes could only strive to imitate
the soeietas perfecta. Each group, as well as each person, had its
place in the great chain of being which was visualized. Gierke found
this group spirit to be particularly strong in Germany, and most
effective at the time of the Conciliar movement, in the early fifteenth
century. After that, Roman Law swept through Germany, and the
rise of the nation-state broke down barriers betiveen the individual
and the state. After the death of Althusius, the German thinker of
the early seventeenth century whom Gierke rescued from obscurity,
these ideas were submerged by the state and the ideological advocates
of the state and of individualism.
A portion of Gierke's great work on these subjects, Political
80. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). But ef. PFEFFE, CHURCH,
STATE, AND FREEDOM 250 (1953).
81. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
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Theories of the Middle Ages, was translated into English in 1900 by
the noted legal historian, F. W. Maitland.82 Maitland contributed a
preface which is one of the few essays of that genre which have really
proved to be important in the history of ideas. In the course of out-
lining Gierke's ideas and insights he added numerous discussions of
English examples and, of the highest importance, a practical modern
setting to the theories. He remarked how the institution of the trust,
with its flexibility and capacity to circumvent unpleasant legal re-
strictions, had served as a shield to permit self-government by many
groups. The Masons were permitted their local rules when Lord
Eldon fortunately thought of the Middle Temple, and having survived
his stern gaze, the autonomy of groups had been established in fact,
if not in theory. It was the theory, Maitland remarked, that was un-
realistic and harsh; the facts had, to the great good fortune of
Englishmen, proved wonderfully supple. In fact, he commented, "it
may be asked whether we ourselves are not the slaves of a jurist's
theory and a little behind the age of Darwin if between the State and
all other groups we fix an immeasurable gulf. ... 113 The jurist was
Hegel, but behind Hegel stood the developments of many centuries.
The claims of the papacy in the Middle Ages, and the countervailing
assertions of the Holy Roman Empire, reinforced by the Roman Law,
planted the seeds of authoritarianism which Bodin, Hobbes, and
others cultivated. Then, in the years of the Enlightenment, the oppos-
ing seeds of individualism grew, until the two were crossed in the
French Revolution and the thoughts of Rousseau. The individual and
the state were the two poles, and between them stood nothing. Dicey
had already shown the importance of one of the greatest enactments of
that philosophy, the Chapelier Law of 1791.14 The nominalism of
Bentham and Spencer and the idealism of Hegel intellectually ruled
the nineteenth century. Maitland believed that the age of Darwin,
the age of the survival of the fittest, required a more fluid conception
of society in which concepts would not freeze out actualities.
In 1904, in his essay Moral Personality and Legal Personality,"
Maitland quoted Dicey's remark that facts, not legal fictions, make a
corporation something different from its individual members. He
again deplored the nineteenth century penchant for transmuting all
relationships into contractual form and ignoring group realities.
Unless groups were treated as something more than an artificial
82. GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES (Maitland transl. 1927).
83. Id. at ix.
84. DIcEY, LAw AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND 467 (2d ed. 1914). See id. at
153-58.
85. Maitland, Moral Personazlity and Legal Personaityf, in 3 COLLECTED PAPERS
304 (1911).
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entity composed only of human entities and nothing more, blunders
would be made.
From this point of view, a blunder had been made by the House of
Lords in that very year, 1904, in the case of Free Church of Scotland
t. Ooertoun.3 This case concerned a proposed merger between the
Free Church of Scotland and the English Presbyterian Church which
was resisted by a minority of the membership of the Scottish church
on the grounds that the merger represented a deviation from the fun-
damental faith of the church and was therefore a breach of trust.
Although the great majority of the members of both churches de-
sired the merger, and despite the fact that the Free Church had come
into being in protest against state control, the House of Lords held
that the handful that followed what the Lords believed to be the
original doctrine of the church could control the church and success-
fully prevent the merger. The trust device had changed from a ser-
vant to a master.
This decision was patently unrealistic; Parliament had to provide
for the effectuation of the merger.: But it did much to justify the
ideas of Maitland and Gierke. It confirmed the pluralistic beliefs of
a scholar and high church clergyman, John Neville Figgis, who pub-
lished in 1914 one of the most telling works of the pluralist movement.
The book, Churches in the Modern State, was not only an able presen-
tation of the case for ecclesiastical self-government, it was also a
rei de coeue . Figgis rejected the concept of the church which had
guided the House of Lords in the Oertoun case, the concept of a
church bound by the faiths of its founders, a legal being whose docu-
ments were to be treated like ordinary contracts. The church was
not merely a creature of the state but had a life of its own. To treat
the church as if it were the product of, say, the Companies Act of
1862, was idiocy. As a matter of fact, all societies were something
more than a collection of human beings. Voluntary societies of all
kinds had a life to live apart from the sufferance of the state. As
Figgis stated, "it is, in a word, a real life and personality which
those bodies are forced to claim, which we believe that they possess
by the nature of the case, and not by the arbitrary grant of the sov-
ereign."' If the test was the involvement of the individual, who could
not produce associations and corporations capable of commanding
loyalty very much like patriotism? "The relations between a member
and his society are more akin to those of a citizen to a State than to
anything in the individual,"' he observed. Indeed, it is possible in
86. See note 25 supra.
87. 1 DUGDALE, ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR 210 (1937).
88. FIGGIS, CHURCHES IN THE MODERN STATE 42 (1914).
89. Id. at 69.
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comparing Maitland with Figgis to note in the ideas of the latter a
slight intensification of the role of voluntary societies. Autonomy
of the group in respect to the state begins to take on more and more
of the character of competition with the state; the actual, quasi-sov-
ereign quality of these groups, intimated by Maitland, is developed
by Figgis. With Figgis, however, the state is still supreme. In a some-
what ambiguous passage which has presented critics with some diffi-
culties, he admitted. that in talking about these voluntary organiza-
tions "the higher their object, the greater danger there is of their
outstepping the bounds of justice in their desire to promote it; and
the greater need therefore of government regulation and control."00
Two concepts can be seen developing. One is the limited concept of
the group as a real person; the other is the broader concept of the
group as a lesser governing authority. The former, which was Mait-
land's main, although not his sole, point, admits of government over-
lordship, but the latter affords the state far less power, and has po-
tentialities of pushing it aside altogether.
Figgis saw that his arguments applied to all groups, but he prized
the rights of churches primarily. The aim of churches was the highest
good, and their claim on their members would, or perhaps should, if
their members conducted themselves as they ought, be correspondingly
high. This sense of devotion infused much of Figgis' Churches in the
Modern State, tending at times to emotionalize his arguments. But it
had the virtue of making his examples more concrete, and it unques-
tionably supplied him with a moral zest which, for better or for worse,
supplied the special quality of much of his ideology. Yet that ideol-
ogy could be divorced from its ecclesiastical base to a large extent,
and the force of his arguments could be applied to a wider area, even if
it were desirable to understand their special significance for churches.
It is a fact that churches have a special status in the American (and
to a perhaps lesser degree, English) mind.01 Figgis always held in
mind the religious aspects of the matter; one of the arguments he
used for church self-rule was the possibility that this would raise
the moral standards of the churches and tend to keep out secular time-
servers. One of his chief arguments for pluralism was that men live
much of their lives and develop much of their capacities in groups,
and it may be surmised that he was thinking particularly of churches.
He hoped for the emancipation of all groups striving for the good life,
and he would have been less the devout Anglican that he was if he
had not pictured churches, and especially his church, in the vanguard.
* This enthusiasm for groups was not, of course, universally held, and
90. Id. at 102.
91. Foreword by Howe, The Supreme Court,' 1952 Term, 67 HARV. L. Rv. 91,
94 (1953).
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even sympathetic critics shied at the emphasis Figgis placed on the
life of these societies. A. D. Lindsay, in a review of Churches in the
Modern State, - complained of the effort to erase the distinction be-
tween real and artificial persons. Lindsay considered that Figgis, in
ignoring this obvious factual distinction, weakened his case for real-
ism in judging social arrangements. Lindsay did not believe that this
oversight destroyed the force of the book, for beyond the personifica-
tion of the group was the deprecation of the state. The state had
been called upon to justify itself, Lindsay noted, and he reviewed what
he thought were the three reasons given for its primacy: its power
to coerce, its ethical role, and its comprehensiveness. He admitted that
the third had particularly strong cogency, for the state could ac-
complish more varied tasks than any other group, but he contended
that this did not establish a qualitative difference between the state
and other bodies. Maitland's immeasurable gulf between the state
and the individual was being rapidly bridged.
The English intellectual atmosphere of 1913-the period of Tory
near-insubordination over Ulster, of Irish rebelliousness, of syndical-
ist agitation among the workers, and even violent suffragette excite-
ment-was not conducive to a marked state-consciousness. Whatever
it might have led to, we do not know, for the First World War shortly
intervened. Even a few months before the war began Ernest Barker
prophesied that "if it comes to a pinch, we shall forget we are any-
thing but citizens."' 3 The accuracy of that prediction had the effect
of minimizing the intellectual turbulence of the years just preceding
the war.
Yet one must remember that there were thinkers who needed no
"pinch" to remind them of their allegiance. The attention given here
to pluralism is not designed to disguise the power of opposing cur-
rents of thought. In the seventeenth century John Selden had said:
Divines ought to doe no more then what the State permitts....
Nothing better expresses the condition of the Christians in those
times [before Constantine] then one of those meetings you have
in London of men of the same Country ... they [the state] gave
the Church as much or as little as they pleased .... "I
This was a very understandable reaction to the power of the churches
of that day and the zeal of their advocates. The dread of the church
acting as a state was demonstrated as late as 1851, in the Ecclesiastical
Titles BillW While the fear of organized religion had declined, respect
for the charismatic quality of the churches had declined also. The
92. Political Quarterly, Feb. 1914, pp. 128, 212.
93. Political Quarterly, Feb. 1915, p. 101.
94. TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 101 (Pollock ed. 1927). See STEPHEN, LiB-
EsTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 114-33 (1874).
95. Ecclesiastical Titles Assumption, 14 & 15 VICT. 419, c. 60 (1851).
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state was still vastly more powerful; it could give the church as much
or as little as it pleased, and the same applied to its treatment of
other organizations. As Justice Holmes wrote, "Admit what per-
sonality you like to the other groups inside of or overlapping the
State-what of it? Man certainly is a personality but the Sovereign
kills him when it sees fit and can." 6 Figgis had challenged the sov-
ereign, but he had not dethroned it.
The most expansive assertations of group rights were to be made by
a much younger man, however, who was the recipient of the letter in
which Justice Holmes made the comment quoted above. Harold Laski,
although an atheist, believed (in the years 1915-21 at least) in the
rights of voluntary societies as strongly as Figgis. In his case the
trade unions took the place of the church, but his ideology involved
a defense of the group qua group. The main contours of pluralistic
thinking had been already laid out, but Laski plowed deeper. The
concept of the group challenging the state's monopoly on sovereignty
had been developed in the works of Maitland and Figgis. Under
Laski it reached its most complete form. In The Problem of Sov-
ereignty he classified the state as "a will to some extent competing
with other wills. ... -97 Elsewhere he remarked of the state that,
"men belong to it; but, also, they belong to other groups, and a com-
petition for allegiance is continually possible."' 8 The growth from
the thought of Maitland is obvious. Maitland had suggested that in
the "age of Darwin" the state might be thought to be somewhat like
another, stronger group, and Laski embraced that concept and that
metaphor. The state was to compete with other groups, in a Dar-
winian fashion, for the loyalty of the people, and if the other groups
won, it must be that the state was no longer fit to be supreme. That
competition was conceived as being waged to convince the people, as
buyers of sovereignty, that they would receive the most beneficial
experience from the group they chose. The business of unions and
corporations, as well as the state, was the highest good for their mem-
bers. The state, placed on this level, could hardly claim a naturally
superior position; it must prove its authority. Laski was not entirely
consistent in this position. At times, like Figgis, he spoke in terms
of group autonomy as well as group competition. But what he princi-
pally added to Figgis' views was, not new ideas, but an extension of
logic which converted organizations from their status of merely pos-
sessing lives of their own to a position tending to threaten even the
life of the state. Perhaps this was but a difference in emphasis but
surely Laski's assertions were bolder than Figgis', and while the latter
96. 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERs 8 (Howe ed. 1953).
97. LASKI, THE PROBLEMS OF SOVEREIGNTY 14 (1917).
98 Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 HARv. L. REv. 404, 425 (1916).
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tended to think of the Overtoun decision as a mistake, Laski felt it
to be an outrage. Of course, Laski admitted the state had authority
over property relations, but the rights of groups (and he definitely
thought of the matter as involving rights) came first.
He did not, however, conceive of these rights as existing in a vac-
uum. Just as the state existed to help achieve the good life for its
members, so did voluntary groups; and one of the principal arguments
for the possession by the latter of independent "lives" was the oppor-
tunity such a concept afforded for not only a development, but an
enrichment of the lives of their members. Laski welcomed Duguit's
conception of the state as a service-providing organism, 99 with the
attending implied limitations on the state's omnipotence. Laski tended,
without stressing the point, to consider groups in the same light.
This would seem to demonstrate a more individualistic emphasis in
Laski's pluralism than has heretofore been expressed but, of course,
consistency was never his forte, and within a few years his pluralist
inclinations had vanished, leaving only a residue to be incorporated in
his Marxist class ideology. Pluralism, as an active philosophy of state,
has not been an important force since Laski. This does not mean,
however, that it has completely vanished. There were, of course, many
more adherents and elements in its diffuse ranks than have been even
tangentially covered in these pages, and some of these have continued
since the First World War. The Gierke-Figgis outlook, with its me-
dieval emphasis, was naturally welcome to the Catholic Church, and
bore some resemblance to the corporatist thought which paralleled plu-
ralism on the continent and which became distorted into Fascism. In
its Catholic form this approach still has vigor, and within the last ten
years an American Jesuit publication, The Jurist, has combined this
concept with the philosophy of Watson v. Jones10 to construct a theory
of jurisdiction which at least would make church internal self-govern-
ment a constitutionally protected right (anticipating Kedroff), and at
most would give churches control over marriages of church members
and in general restore the churches to a quasi-medieval status.101 The
potentialities of converting groups into little states is implicit in
pluralism, and particularly so in the thinking of Laski. This possi-
bility always has been minimized in English thought but, particularly
when mixed with communalistic ideas, the opportunities for its growth
are great. In South Africa today, certain Nationalist thinkers consider
99. Duguit, The Law and the State, 31 HARv. L. REv. 1, 185 (1917).
100. See note 6 supra.
101. K. R. O'Brien and D. E. O'Brien, Freedom of Religion in Restatement of
Inter-Church-and-State Common Law, 6 JURIsT 503 (1946); K. R. O'Brien and
D. E. O'Brien, Restatement of Inter-Church-and-State Common Law, 5 JURIST 73
(1945).
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one of the possibilities of apartheid to be a kind of pluralism, a race
syndicalism.
In this country the similarities between pluralism and federalism
are most apparent. In 1917 Laski commented that in America, "the
classic home of federalism, nowhere is there ground more fertile for
such seed as M. Duguit has sown."'11 2 There is indisputably a strong
national tradition of distribution of power, of distrust of omnipotence.
Perhaps this has entered into our treatment of church problems. In
1906 a writer remarked that the recent Overtoun case was the British
way, while Watson v. Jones was the American way, of handling intra-
church disputes-a tribute, he believed, to our pattern of law. 10 3 Very
recently, Professor Paul Freund has reminded us that a federalist is
at least something of a pluralist.10 4 This is not an American insight;
the influence on Figgis of Lord Acton, an advocate of federalism and
certainly a pluralist of sorts, indicates another side of the pluralist
tradition.
Yet it may be questioned how far pluralistic beliefs have become a
part of our political inheritance. Certainly recent interventions by the
state into areas of society formerly considered immune from govern-
mental control indicate that in time of stress the autonomy of the
group is not so highly regarded. But perhaps the law has absorbed
more pluralistic ideas than one might think. Certain ideas, such as a
greater respect for the viability of corporations and unions, have come
into the law in the last generation. Some jurists have been more in-
fluenced than others; Professor Chafee has even gone so far as to
comment on the desirability of considering "the state itself as just one
more kind of association."'105 Not many lawyers agree with that con-
cept, but the less radical pluralist concept of the group as a person has
more support. It has, in fact, been espoused by the Supreme Court,
at least to some extent.
It is Professor Howe's position that the Kedroff decision follows the
pluralist tradition in treating the group as a person. 00 When Justice
Reed's words are considered in a literal sense, it would seem that
this is so. This would not be so revolutionary. Although the Hague
case expresses the general rule that only real persons have a right to
liberty, there have been exceptions to that rule. Professor Hale'07 has
102. Note, 31 HARv. L. Rsv. 186, 191 (1917).
103. Peck, American versus British Ecclesiastical Law, 15 YALE L.J. 225(1906).
104. 10 PERSPECTIVES USA 9 (1954).
105. Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L.
REv. 993, 1029 (1930).
106. Foreword by Howe, The Supreme Court, 1952 Term, 67 HARV. L. REV. 91(1953).
107. Hale, Some Basic Constitutional Rights of Economic Significance, 51
CoLum. L. REv. 271, 311 (1951).
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pointed out that the cases of Grosjean v. American Press Co.0 8 and
Bridges v. California'0 " grant to publishing companies the right to
invoke the constitutional objections against infringement of freedom
of the press. The reason is clear: if only individuals can claim these
rights a great amount of suppression may be permitted. So it may
be argued in Kedroff, for unless the church has something like a right,
constitutional safeguards will be lost and religion will be controlled
by the state. Of course, in the past, individuals have been the parties
to the lawsuit. Is that merely a technicality? If the individual must
invoke the claims of the church to have a constitutional right, it is
really the liberty of the church that is being protected. It is submitted,
however, that it is also possible to look at the problem in another way.
The parties raising the issue of the fourteenth amendment may have
rights as members of the church. The right of the church to decide
its own affairs is the right of each member to facilitate his worship
by controlling the property incident to that worship, and any member
can claim a violation of his own right by the invasion of the church's
self-government. If the church rules provide for a system other than
majority rule, the fact that a majority are against the party raising
the issue is irrelevant; the minority retains the right. In a completely
hierarchical church, one member may assert such a right against
all the others.
This interpretation avoids the complex and confusing potentialities
of the more pluralistic one. It may be asked what immediate practical
consequences this entails, and the answer would be that there are few.
Perhaps in the very unusual case where all the members of a non-con-
gregational church act in defiance of church rules this interpretation
would mean that the rules could be ignored, since no one could raise
the point. It would certainly mean that the right protected in the
Kedroff case would be that of the American churchgoers loyal to the
Moscow leadership, and not the right of the Moscow leadership itself.
But the less immediate results are by far the more important. If the
somewhat doctrinaire idea of the church as a person is not accepted,
much less the more extreme thoughts of the pluralists, each case can
be considered more flexibly as a problem in itself. When one thinks
of these problems as examples of conflicts of individual wills, then the
particular needs of the individuals involved, the difficulties of excep-
tional cases, and the nuances of different churches can be more readily
treated. The real problem in the Kedroff case was the ambiguous posi-
tion of the Russian Orthodox Church leadership living under the au-
thority of a totalitarian atheist state. It may materially differ whether
one approaches this question from the standpoint of church rights, or
108. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
109. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
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from the standpoint of the interests of the members, that is, the inter-
ests of the members in a very long range sense, for we must look to
their interests as Selden and Locke looked to the interests of a man
condemned to be hanged. He does not consent now, but he consented
previously to a rule of law which carried this penalty and he cannot
now revoke his acceptance. This does not mean that very exceptional
situations may not make other determinations desirable, as in the
Kedroff case.
This interpretation is not meant to imply that the Kedroff deci-
sion is wrong. Surely, a state legislature's ipse dixit must be con-
sidered with great suspicion; if an enactment by the majority of a
legislature provides, for example, that judicial notice must be taken
of a fact which is very difficult to prove, grave impairments of our
liberties may take place. The pitfalls inherent in the Douds decision
are becoming increasingly clear; it has been pointed out that the
Kedroff decision is valid only as an indication of a less serious situa-
tion, not sufficient to warrant legislative intervention, than that in
Douds.10 If this is so, it is a seriously thin safeguard, a demonstration
of the tendencies inherent in the liberal dogma of the 1930's in regard
to judicial power.1 "' Professor Howe suggests that this problem
should not be treated as a unity, but rather that Kedroff should be
construed as giving religious liberties a more preferred position than
others. 12 It is not the place here to go into the argument about pre-
ferred liberties and rights; that religion has some special status is ac-
cepted by many commentators. This does not directly involve the
question of pluralism, although, as Professor Howe points out, it
would indicate a philosophy Figgis could accept, if not Laski."31
Whether or not the doctrine of Kedroff is limited to religious cases, it
does grant to churches, or members thereof, a definite right against
interference by legislatures, and perhaps courts.
It is possible to reject the pluralistic version and still consider the
Kedr.off opinion as going beyond the New York Court of Appeals in-
terpretation1 4 Absent a very pressing reason, decisions of a civil
court determining the religious tenets of a faith, or the rules of church
government, contrary to the decisions of the church body which has
a right to decide these matters might be considered a violation of the
110. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952), The Supreme Court,
1952 Term, 67 HARv. L. REV. 91, 109 (1953).
111. This was foreshadowed by Judge Wagner's opinion in Missouri v. Cum-
zings, 36 Mo. 263 (1865), Tev'd, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866), where he con-
cluded with a declaration of the value of judicial deference to the legislature
which reads as if it had been written in the 1940's.
112. Foreword by Howe, The Supreme Court, 1952 Term, 67 HARV. L. REv. 91,
92-93 (1953).
113. Id. at 93.
114. See text supported by note 71 supra.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1956/iss1/9
COURTS AND THE CHURCHES
rights of any member who wished to abide by the results of the
church decision. Of course, this means that the crucial question fre-
quently will be one of degree but, as Holmes remarked, most of the
great questions of the law are matters of degree. Within broad limits,
the church authority having the right to determine church law will
have constitutional protection, even if derivative, for its determina-
tions and adjudications. But the scope of this protection will not be
unhmited, and the nature of the protection will be centered on the in-
dividual members of the church.
After all, the individual members are the important factors. The
experiences of the past quarter-century vividly demonstrate the impor-
tant role that voluntary groups play in preserving individual liberties.
The right to join organizations to defend one's substantive rights has
been recognized to be of the highest importance in protecting those
rights. The analyses of the pluralists, in bringing out the benefits to
the individual of group activities and in demonstrating the need for
ensuring that groups remain voluntary and free from state coercion,
have proved valuable. In a free society, social propensities are not
well understood by classing them as antithetical to the private life of
the individual. This is so because, as far as the state permits (and in
a free society this must be considerable) each man may partake of the
social as an extension of the individual. The freedom to quit, the zest
for introverson, is as much a part of these rights as their opposites.
Group thinking may create ten tyrants in place of one. This is the
great danger of pluralism from the libertarian point of view. Laski's
little states may create only a proliferation of coercive powers, more
sovereigns to subject the individual. Nor is this limited to Laski. It
is unfortunately implicit in some of Figgis' ideas, for Figgis had as one
of his purposes the restoration of the church to a previously held posi-
tion of authority in society. Figgis believed that the agitation for
abolition of all state support for church education was a step against
his pluralistic principles. The case of Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Board of Edzuation,"7 where it was held that the utilization of the
public school system to enable sectarian authorities to give religious
instruction to public school students in public school buildings was
unconstitutional, would have seemed to Figgis to have been a depriva-
tion of ecclesiastical liberty. This was a particular example of a spirit
in his works unfriendly to the rights of individuals independent of
groups. Figgis wrote in Churches in the Modern State:
Persecution is normally condemned on the ground that it tampers
with the individual conscience. But the very conception of per-
sonality we were developing in the last lecture seems to militate
115. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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against this view. If the individual only comes to himself as a
part of society, his conscience is always partially social. Why
should not the society which has made him what he is assert an
authority in the last resort coercive against him?",6
That way Mussolini lies. We should be careful to take our pluralism
in small doses.
These small doses do create a greater constitutional restraint on the
actions of the states, if the interpretation of the Kedroff opinion
presented in these pages is sound. If so, what will be the effect on
Missouri law? It seems clear that, under any but the narrow view of
Kedroff adopted by the New York Court of Appeals, 117 Watson v.
Garvin"8 and Boyles v. Roberts' 9 are no longer binding authority.
The assumption of authority by the civil courts to declare what the
powers of the church are on matters in which church law is relevant
is almost as obsolete as the analogous power of federal courts to decide
state law under Swift v. Tyson. In the dispute over concepts of juris-
diction which the two Watson cases 120 featured, it is submitted that
the concept which thinks of the church's jurisdiction as primary and
the state's jurisdiction as largely derivative has prevailed. This has
not really been contested in Missouri since Hayes v. Manning, 12 ' and
the results have been satisfactory to most people.
This modified pluralism, featuring a broad respect for group (and
especially church) autonomy, is implicit in Hayes v. Manning and in
Watson v. Jones, even if it is a matter of common law and not con-
stitutional law. It might be claimed that the language of Judge Walker
in the Hayes case, and that of Judge Woodson dissenting in Boyles v.
Roberts, goes farther and adopts a truly pluralistic position. Indeed,
the counsel for the pro-merger party in the Hayes case argued that
"under our system of government, the church is a free institution,
having all its powers in itself, and deriving them from no other body
or government whatsoever.'122- Laski could scarcely have asserted
more. But it is unlikely that either judge really went that far; it was
of course sufficient for both to characterize the merger as an act not
reviewable by civil courts.
The statement by counsel quoted above cannot be upheld as a true
statement of the law when it is considered in the light of Missouri
statutes and decisions, and it is extremely improbable that Kedroff
has altered this situation. To take an obvious example, Sections
352.150 and 352.180 of the Missouri Revised Statutes of 1949 set forth
116. FIGGIS, op. cit. supra note 89, at 116.
117. See note 71 supra.
118. See note 5 supra.
119. See note 26 supra.
120. See text supported by notes 5-6 supra.
121. See note 33 supra.
122. 263 Mo. 1, 9 (1914).
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rules to be followed in respect to merger and dissolution of churches.
In the case of Sosiza v. Fishman,, -"; the St. Louis Court of Appeals held
that the mere closing of the physical facilities, of the church was
not sufficient, in the absence of legal steps complying with the statute,
to effect a valid dissolution of the religious organization. The pro-
vision of Section 352.180 requiring a vote of 75 per cent of the mem-
bership for dissolution does raise some problems in light of the Kedroff
decision, but it is probable that general rules relating to the title to
the property and general status of the church can be validly controlled
by the state. These are the fringe areas of the intra-church problem,
areas where internal affairs come close to becoming external as well,
and rigid theories are inapplicable.
The issue of incorporation also poses these problems. The Klix
case,2' decided that the form in which the title to property is held is
not controlling, that the distinction between the corporate and unin-
corporated form does not make a difference. Yet it can be seen that
inconveniences may arise because the title is in hands other than those
actually having authority. A Catholic legal scholar, Joseph Dignan,
has complained that in Missouri the traditional conception of the
parish as a persova moralis was not sufficiently appreciated, and that
it was necessary to maintain the title in the Archbishop in fee sim-
ple. I The Ktbx case might show that this was not necessary, but very
likely desirable in order to avoid difficulty. However, the Klix case and
the Olcai- case'2 demonstrate that the civil courts will tend to uphold
the Roman Catholic authority over the church regardless of the form
in which the property is held. But, of course, special problems might
arise, particularly in respect to cases where the trust element seems
important.
The matter of trust interpretation always pervades these matters,
and the capacity of courts to view intra-church disputes in the guise of
trust enforcement is usually possible because of the widespread use
of equitable interests as a substitute for incorporation. With the ex-
ception of Mari v. Galbraith,"2 7 Missouri law has moved toward the
direction indicated in Watson v. Jones s and has limited trust inter-
pretations to cases in which the grantor was clearly setting up a trust
and not merely making a gift. It is hard to see how the United States
Supreme Court could prevent a wider use of this device, although its
very great enlargement to cover all conceivable questions might enable
the federal courts to prevent such circumvention of the Kedroff case.
123. 154 S.W.2d 398 (Mo. App. 1941).
124. See note 36 supra.
125. DIGNAN, A HISTORY OF THE LEGAL INCORPORATION OF CATHOLIC CHURCH
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126. See note 42 supra.
127. See note 55 supra.
128. See note 6 supra.
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Today it seems that the Missouri law has reached a position which
sensibly discourages civil decisions on most church matters, while
maintaining some control in the outer periphery. The trust and prop-
erty outlooks which reached their heights in Judge Graves' opinion in
the Boyles case 29 have been discarded without federal pressure. To-
day, the dichotomy between property and nonproperty matters, al-
though still repeated, is an empty formula; the decisions are made on
other criteria. It is not generally profitable to view conflicts between
church members concerning control of the church as a property dis-
pute. It is not profitable conceptually, for the property is better
thought of as going with the church and the issue as one of control and
use, rather than ownership. It is not profitable practically, for unless
one treats the matter as simply a property question, as Judge Graves
and Justice Jackson did, the complications will destroy the initial
premises. This issue is not confined to religious groups; the weakness
of the contract theory of union funds has been indicated, 10 and Pro-
fessor Chafee has discussed the disadvantage of recognizing vested
rights in treasury money in various voluntary groups.13 1
Missouri courts have tended to uphold group autonomy in non-
religious organizations as well as religious, as the cases of Branden-
burger v. Jefferson Club Ass'n 32 and State ex rel. Cammann v. Tower
Grove Turn Verein'33 indicate. That state courts are not eager to as-
sist a member expelled from a professional organization might be de-
duced from State ex rel. Hyde v. Jackson City Medical Society.1' In
short, Missouri does not tend to give religious groups any conspicuous
superiority in immunity from state intervention in internal matters,
but appears to follow a general policy of permitting wide areas of
autonomy. A good example is the immunity against an action for
defamation granted to church forums when they hear charges against
members or ministers. This doctrine was established by the Missouri
Supreme Court in Landis v. Campbell."'1 The court there stated:
[P] ersons who join churches . . . voluntarily submit themselves
to the jurisdiction of those bodies, and in matters of faith and
individual conduct affecting their relations as members thereof,
subject themselves to the tribunals established by those bodies
S. . and, if aggrieved by a decision against them, made in good
faith by such judicatories, they must seek their redress within the
organization. .... .31
129. See note 20 supra.
130. Note, 63 HARV. L. Rsv. 1413 (1950).
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A famous reaffirmation of the immunity was made in Warren v.
Pulitzer Publishing Co.' The immunity was extended to fraternal
organizations in Fisher v. Myers.""' This privilege to conduct proceed-
ings with immunity from judicial interference is qualified, however,
and not absolute. If the charges made before these tribunals are false
and the proceedings were maliciously or falsely carried on to cover an
intended scandal, they are not privileged and the maker is subject
to a civil action for defamation.," This is surely reasonable, yet
one must note that the civil courts are looking into statements made
"within" the church, and it is somewhat doubtful that the right pro-
tected is a property right. Of course there is a right in good reputa-
tion, but it would seem that it is less of a property right than that of
a clergyman to his job, and we have seen that civil courts do not
endeavour to protect the latter.110
A more realistic and desirable way of approaching the question of
civil intervention into intra-church affairs is to view it as dependent
on the necessity of making a decision and on the need to preserve the
rights of church members against extreme and totally unwarranted
steps by those in control of the church. The clear example of the
situation where a decision is necessary is the case where two parties
come before the civil courts and each of them claims to be or to rep-
resent the body within the church with jurisdiction over the matter
in dispute. A determination of which group has the authority is, of
course, a prerequisite to the enforcement of the judgment of the
church. It is not easy, of course, to determine what the criteria for
jurisdiction should be in this area. If, under the church constitution
or other governing rules, the membership has the final word regarding
certain functions, does the determination of the membership, acting
ultra vires, have binding force? If not, does this mean that the civil
court must make its omn findings regarding all the church organiza-
tion law? The relevance of these issues to the problems that have
faced Mlissouri courts in the last decade is obvious.
It is also possible, under the rubric of jurisdiction, to devise certain
due process standards. It has been suggested in the Washington Uni-
'er'*s;ti Law Quarterly that,
By analogy to the jurisdictional requirements of the civil courts,
it can be said that the failure of a union to accord a member these
opportunities [for fair procedure] results in the union's failure
to perform the procedural prerequisites for it to obtain jurisdic-
137. 216 Mo. 184, 78 S.W.2d 404 (1934).
128. 39 Mo. 1196, 100 S.W.2d 551 (1936).
1,9. Landis v. Campbell, 79 Mo. 433, 440 (1883).
140. See note 41 supra.
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tion over the person of the member involved, even though the
tribunal may have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
controversy. 141
This is probably more appropriate in consideration of union decisions,
where the organization frequently exerts a high degree of control over
the members' livelihoods, than in ecclesiastical questions. Such a wide
power to intervene in church affairs would have the danger of rein-
stating a great amount of state intervention under the guise of de-
termining jurisdiction. But it must be recognized that there are cer-
tain situations in which a very strong case can be made for the state
courts to ignore the final church authority and yet retain a philosophy
of church autonomy. A case of bribery or intimidation poses this case
most clearly. A more cogent example would come up in a situation
where a group of Moslems join an Episcopalian church under false
colors and then vote to convert the church to Islam. This is what
Commissioner Wolfe was considering in Mertz -v. Schaeffer'42 when
he stated that the court would not permit a group to change the beliefs
of a church from one religion to another. His language perhaps
permitted too wide a scope for civil court investigation of such doc-
trinal matters in a congregational church and seemed to preclude any
investigation at all in a synodic church if the synod is won over. Great
care should be taken by the civil courts to avoid deciding these re-
ligious issues, and therefore the degree of permissible change even by
assemblies dominated by recent members should be broad; but at some
point it would seem suitable for a check to be placed by civil courts
upon the wrenching of a church from its traditional moorings by "tem-
porary" majorities.
This check comes down to a matter of degree and seems to depend
upon the beliefs and perhaps even the instincts of judges who deal
with problems as they arise. Its limitation rests in the vitality of the
philosophy of church freedom espoused in Hayes v. Manning.'43 A
number of the recent cases have been considered deviations from that
philosophy, "explicable as inadvertent departures from the principle
to which they claim to adhere." 44 It has been suggested that these
cases-Trett and Longmeyer and Murr 4 -- are harmonious and con-
sistent with that spirit of church freedom. They should be considered
to be within the exceptions which have just been outlined-exceptions
not inconsistent, but complementary to the state policy definitely
established in Missouri by the Hayes case.
141. Note, 1954 WAsH. U.L.Q. 440, 451.
142. See note I supra.
143. See note 33 supra.
144. Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 421, 485 (1951).
145. See text at p. 82 supra.
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Three generations of Missouri decisions have demonstrated a large
area of consistent legal growth in an orderly fashion. This growth
has not led to pluralism in any thoroughgoing meaning of the term.
Churches are not treated as real persons in the eyes of the law, but
the living elements of their nature have been in fact recognized. Re-
ligious groups are not considered as societies competing with the state,
yet within their orbit it is true that they make a law of sorts, and that
the law so made is respected in the tribunals of the state. This would
probably not fully satisfy Figgis; it would certainly not satisfy Laski;
but it is a compromise ably demonstrating the skills of Anglo-Ameri-
can law in reaching a tenable middle course. The Missouri law on
intervention by civil courts into intra-church disputes has thus trav-
eled along the 'a. media, perhaps a little on the anti-intervention side
of the road, and it is to be hoped that it will stay there.
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